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Abstract 
Understanding of the near-Earth asteroid impact hazard has been evolving.  As larger near-Earth objects (NEOs) are retired from concern 
by the Spaceguard Survey, as new search strategies oriented toward short-term warning are brought on line, as we understand the 
increasing danger from NEOs in the 15 m to 40 m size range, and in the aftermath of the 2013 Chelyabinsk impact disaster, attention 
necessarily must shift toward dealing with the most likely dangerous impacts, those in the range of Chelyabinsk to Tunguska.  
Appropriate responses to predicted impacts by smaller NEOs involve civil defense and emergency planning endeavors.  Deflection of an 
NEO’s trajectory by spacecraft impact, or other means, is becoming a less likely type of mitigation than evacuation.  We need more 
research on the environmental and human consequences of diverse types of hypervelocity NEOs interacting with the Earth’s atmosphere, 
oceans, and land surfaces. 
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1. Introduction 
Among natural disasters, the hypervelocity impact of a near-Earth asteroid or comet (called near-Earth objects or NEOs) 
is dramatically different from all others in several respects.  Given that the velocity of an NEO impact on Earth is two 
orders-of-magnitude faster than that of a jet airliner, the energy density of the NEO (proportional to velocity squared) is 
beyond imagination in a normal human context.  The NEO penetrates the atmosphere in less than a few seconds and, 
depending on its mass and density, explodes either in the lower atmosphere or upon contact with the ground.  The 
immediate effects of the explosion occur nearly instantaneously, unlike almost any other natural event except a lightning 
strike.  Of course, there are consequences that are more long-lasting and distant from “ground-zero” and more nearly 
resemble other natural disasters.  These include seismic quakes, shock waves and high winds, fires, falling debris, etc.  The 
nature of these consequences are understood to a degree and encoded in an on-line application, “Impact: Earth!” 
(www.purdue.edu/impactearth/).  Of course, for impacts exceeding a few megatons (MT) in energy (that of the 1908 
Tunguska impact in Siberia), we have no observed cases on Earth, so estimates of environmental consequences of an impact 
explosion come from somewhat analogous and larger nuclear weapons tests, observations of more energetic impacts in the 
cosmos (especially that of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 into Jupiter in 1994), inferences from long-lasting remnants of such 
blasts (e.g. impact craters on the Earth and other planets), and numerical or theoretical extrapolations.  Impacts just above or 
into an ocean are especially poorly understood because the population density of oceans is low (people in boats or 
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airplanes), impact craters in water immediately collapse, and the physics of how breaking waves from collapsing craters 
turn into dangerous tsunami is chaotic and poorly understood. 
There are other kinds of important differences between NEO impacts and more common natural disasters [1].  In 
particular, most NEO impacts can, in principle, be predicted with exceptional precision, often long in advance, and we have 
the technical capacity, again in principle, to cause a predicted impact not to happen by deflecting or destroying the 
oncoming NEO.  This contrasts, for example, with the difficult but improving capability of meteorologists to predict 
tornadoes and the nearly total inability to warn of impending earthquake damage with longer than ~10 seconds notice.  Also, 
humanity currently has minimal capability of preventing a natural disaster from happening (avalanches are a partial 
exception).  As I discuss below, our ability to predict NEO impacts in advance is incomplete although improving.  Also, our 
technical capability to deflect a threatening NEO applies to most but not all scenarios and is especially subject to logistical, 
political, and economic considerations. 
In the natural disaster field, the term “mitigation” is used for generic attempts to lessen the negative effects of a disaster.  
“Mitigation” can include prevention, but since that is generally not possible, it generally means actions to reduce casualties 
or damage such as by strengthening infrastructure so as to better survive a disaster (e.g. via building codes for earthquakes), 
practicing and implementing measures such as shelter-in-place or evacuation, developing better emergency response 
procedures, improving risk and disaster communications, etc.  In the NEO hazards community, the term “mitigation” has 
often been used interchangeably with “deflection” since most analysis has concerned trying to prevent NEO impacts by 
mounting spacecraft missions to deflect a threatening NEO from striking the Earth, usually by giving the NEO a small delta-
velocity many years in advance.  But, as I argue below, deflection is probably a relatively rare way to mitigate the threat of 
an oncoming NEO. 
2. Increasing importance of impacts by smaller NEOs 
The NEO impact hazard was generally not recognized, with a few exceptions (e.g. in some science fiction), until the 
early 1980s when increasing numbers of near-Earth asteroids were being discovered by a couple of telescopic surveys and 
Alvarez et al. [2] proposed that the great extinction 66 million years ago, which rendered most dinosaurs and many other 
species of life extinct, was due to an asteroid impact.  At that time, nearly all near-Earth asteroids that had been discovered 
were well over 1 km in diameter, ranging up to a couple tens of km diameter.  Early estimates of damage from an NEO 
impact [3] suggested that possible major global consequences could result from impact by an NEO >~1.5 km diameter.  
Therefore, building in a little margin, initial goals of telescopic searches for NEOs were to find 90% of those >1 km 
diameter, a feat accomplished a few years ago by the Spaceguard Survey (http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/programs/). 
Of course, during the augmented surveys by more sensitive detectors in the 1990s, many smaller NEOs were discovered.  
NEOs follow a rather steep power-law size distribution, so smaller NEOs are much more common, though harder to 
discover, than larger ones.  Thus attention turned to devising ways to deflect NEOs in the size range of many tens of meters 
to hundreds of meters.  In an influential report from 2003 [4], it was concluded that a strike by an NEO <40 m diameter 
would be essentially harmless.  In 2005, a law passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by the President called for a new 
survey to find 90% of NEOs >140 m diameter, a size deemed likely to be dangerous on the spatial scale of a nation or large 
American state; a survey down to such a size was deemed to be practical given modern developments of ground-based and 
space-based telescopes.  Accomplishing this George E. Brown, Jr., NEO Survey remains the law though full 
implementation of the survey has not been funded, which would be required to complete the survey on the timescale 
originally mandated. 
More recent developments have highlighted the need to shift attention to even smaller, but still dangerous, NEO impact 
possibilities. 
First, improved understanding of the physics of the interaction with the atmosphere of the penetrating hypervelocity 
object [5] demonstrates differences between that case and the previously modeled cases of a stationary lower atmospheric 
explosion.  It turns out that the downward momentum of the impactor considerably augments the damage done on the 
ground.  It is now believed that the devastation at the Tunguska site might have been caused by an impactor as small as 30 
or 40 m diameter (~3 MT) rather than one 50 m or larger (e.g. the >10 MT commonly quoted in the earlier literature).  Thus 
the earlier estimated limiting size for danger of 40 m [4] must be reduced. 
This was recently demonstrated by the NEO impact over Chelyabinsk, Russia, in February 2013, when an impactor just 
20 m in diameter damaged 7,000 buildings and about 1,500 people sought medical attention at area hospitals (albeit mostly 
with superficial wounds from flying glass; less than 10% were actually hospitalized) [6,7].  In fact, the unusually low angle 
of attack of that projectile somewhat minimized the downward momentum compared with more likely steeper angles, so 
Chelyabinsk provides a serious warning that even smaller impactors (perhaps ~15 m diameter) could be equally dangerous.  
On the other hand, to put Chelyabinsk in perspective, the majority of NEO impacts occur in or over the ocean and the vast 
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majority of impacts over land would be over much less densely populated regions than the metropolitan area of a city with a 
population over 1 million, so the dangerous consequences from another such impact would likely be much reduced, or even 
zero. 
Still another reason for shifting our attention from impacts by NEOs >1.5 km diameter to smaller ones is the success of 
the Spaceguard Survey.  Prior to the survey, large NEOs were responsible for all but a couple percent of predicted fatalities.  
As of 2013 [8,9,10] the fatality rate from as-yet-undiscovered large NEOs had dropped by more than an order-of-magnitude 
and the residual risk from small NEOs (~30 m to 150 m diameter) had risen to about 25% of the total hazard. 
Finally, in the context of practical civil defense measures, it is essential to consider the role of uncertainty in the 
prediction of an NEO impact and its potential consequences.  Currently, the vast majority of impacts of Tunguska-sized and 
smaller impactors will happen with no advance notice.  But the unexpected discovery and predicted impact (less than a day 
later into the Nubian Desert of northern Sudan) of asteroid 2008 TC3, brought attention to the possibility of quite readily 
discovering many small asteroids, and even smaller meteoroids, during the final hours, days, or months before they actually 
strike, when they become much brighter than most NEOs of similar size as they get very close to impact [11,12].  NASA is 
funding development of ATLAS (the Asteroid Terrestrial-impact Last Alert System), scheduled to be operational in 2016, 
that in principle should be able to provide hours to months of advance warning of about 50% of NEO impacts (those coming 
from the night sky rather than from the direction of the Sun).  As 2008 TC3 demonstrated, the precision in prediction of 
time and location of such an impact will usually be very high.  But there could be large uncertainty in the size, mass, and 
hence potential damage from the impactor.  It is problematical whether ground-based or space-based telescopes would be 
able to measure the albedo (reflectivity) or reflectance spectrum of a newly discovered NEO prior to its imminent impact.  
Without a measured albedo, the apparent magnitude (brightness) of a NEO could be due to a highly reflective NEO of a 
specific size or to a very dark one perhaps four times bigger or many tens of times more massive.  In some cases, 
measurement of the reflectance spectrum of a NEO could provide a clue about the likely density of the body, but NEO 
densities can vary by an order-of-magnitude.  Indeed, a few percent of NEOs (and meteorite falls) are of nickel-iron 
composition with high bulk density and strength; these are responsible for creating most of the smaller impact craters on 
Earth’s surface, like the Arizona Barringer crater (“Meteor Crater”) because they can impact the ground more-or-less intact 
rather than exploding in the atmosphere.  Given such variations in albedo and bulk density, and the difficulties of estimating 
these attributes before impact, a prudent civil defense official should probably provide warning to local citizens of predicted 
impacts by bodies with nominal sizes even as small as 5 meters, for they could – in reality – be considerably larger and 
dangerous. 
3.  To Deflect or Not to Deflect? 
Until the last decade or so, most NEOs being discovered by the Spaceguard Survey were sufficiently large that if one 
were predicted to be on an Earth-impact trajectory, it would threaten a sufficiently great catastrophe that trying to prevent 
the impact from happening would be the obvious course.  A book [13] reviewing the wide range of options under 
consideration a decade ago considered approaches ranging from the straightforward (e.g. kinetic hypervelocity impactor) to 
the exotic (solar sail) to the ridiculous (antimatter).  More recent studies have led to the discovery of the gravity tractor [14] 
and more detailed analyzes of other practical approaches that involve largely already developed technologies.  The 
consensus reached in a study by the National Research Council [15] is that a fairly simple, effective approach for most 
threatening impact scenarios by NEOs >100 m diameter is to use the largest launch vehicles to deliver one or more massive 
projectiles into the threatening NEO years or even decades in advance to change the NEOs trajectory so as to miss the Earth, 
with margin to spare.  Ideally, associated with the kinetic impactor, one would try to send another spacecraft into 
rendezvous with the NEO to characterize the body in advance, to observe the impact, and to measure the degree of 
deflection achieved.  If the observer spacecraft is equipped to be a gravity tractor, it could then deterministically tweak the 
orbit to avoid having the new trajectory of the NEO pass through a resonant-return “keyhole” for later Earth impact, which 
might accidentally result because of the inherent imprecision of a kinetic impact (e.g. due to the poorly known momentum 
multiplier resulting from crater ejecta) . 
In a minority of cases, the future Earth impact of a NEO results from an earlier keyhole passage, in which case prior 
deflection from passing through the keyhole (generally orders of magnitude smaller than the Earth) would be readily 
feasible, even with the relatively weak deflection capability of a gravity tractor. 
Another much more robust approach to deflection is utilization of a nuclear device, either to explode on or below the 
surface of the NEO, or to spray the surface of the NEO with, for example, neutrons by an above-the-surface stand-off 
explosion.  Because of widespread public concern about using nuclear devices in space, the nuclear option is generally 
considered to be the option of last resort.  There are two generic cases where a kinetic impactor, using known capabilities or 
those predicted to be available in the near-term, is insufficient to deflect an NEO but a nuclear device could succeed.  First, 
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for an NEO about 1 km or larger in diameter, even a series of kinetic impactors would typically yield inadequate deflection, 
so the nuclear option would be the only one available.  While such a scenario is possible, it is extremely unlikely, since far 
less than 0.1% of NEOs larger than the Tunguska impactor exceed 1 km diameter…and well over 90% of those have 
already been discovered and found not to be a threat during the next century. 
  The other, much more problematic case for which a nuclear blast would be the only option is if there were inadequate 
time between discovery of the NEO and the predicted impact to mount a successful kinetic impactor mission.  The duration 
to mount a high-priority deflection mission varies depending on the specific circumstances, but it would generally take at 
least several years.  It is much more likely, for an NEO discovered by the Spaceguard Survey or by most other general 
surveys that have been proposed or are in development (e.g. Pan-STARRS, LSST, Sentinel) to be found many years to 
many decades before impact, but a short-warning case could happen.  (The even shorter warnings for impacts of small 
NEOs that will be provided by an ATLAS-like system do not generally apply to this discussion of deflecting NEOs >100 m 
diameter.)  A problem with short-term deflection is that the required delta-velocity would be much greater than in the 
typical case, resulting in greater stresses within the NEO and the possibility of it breaking up in unpredictable ways. If the 
resulting fragments were perceived by the public to be potentially radioactive, there would be especially serious political 
opposition to such an approach.  Therefore, “last minute” deployment of a nuclear device does not appear to be a viable 
approach to mitigating an impact.  Given the low likelihood of an NEO impact disaster in our lifetimes, and the small 
chance that non-nuclear deflection could not be achieved in such a case, reports [16] that the U.S. National Nuclear Security 
Administration is retaining nuclear warhead components scheduled for disassembly because of their potential use in 
planetary defense against NEOs may be misguided. 
As discussed in the previous Section, an increasing fraction of NEO discoveries involve bodies smaller than 100 m and 
they constitute an ever larger fraction of the remaining risk from NEO impact.  Clearly, for the smallest NEOs or meteoroids 
(e.g. <10 m nominal diameter) the most reasonable kind of mitigation is to shelter-in-place and avoid being near windows.  
For somewhat larger predicted impacts, ocean vessels would be advised to avoid ground-zero or people on land might be 
encouraged to evacuate to a safe distance.  Evacuation would be a relatively trivial thing to accomplish in a typical case, but 
in the very unlikely case that the warning time were short and/or the target were a densely populated area, it could be more 
difficult, as exemplified by the nearly 100 evacuation-related deaths in the Houston area as Hurricane Rita approached in 
2005. 
Opinions differ on the threshold NEO size where civil defense measures should give way to the much more costly, but 
perhaps more certain, mitigation achieved by deflection, whether by kinetic impactor or gravity tractor.  Clearly, attributes 
of the specific threat will partially shape the conclusion.  In many cases the specific ground-zero would not be known before 
major expenditures would be necessary to develop a deflection mission.  On the other hand, generally the “risk corridor” 
would be known (the narrow path across the Earth’s globe where the NEO would be constrained to hit) but the position 
along the path would become known only long after the decision to deflect (or not) had been made.  A risk corridor passing 
solely across oceans and very sparsely populated lands might suggest a “let it hit” decision, even for an NEO approaching 
100 m in size, whereas a risk corridor temporarily identified for the NEO 99942 Apophis some months after its discovery in 
2004 traversed Europe, the Middle East, and heavily populated regions of India, exemplifying a much more concerning 
scenario (that 2029 impact possibility is now completely ruled out). 
Following a decision to launch a deflection mission, there would be a period of building (or retrofitting) the two 
spacecraft (an observer spacecraft and a kinetic deflector), another duration between launch and arrival/s at the NEO, and 
yet another period for the applied delta-velocity to diverge the path sufficiently so that the NEO misses the Earth.  The 
specific scenario might result in shorter or much longer durations from average.  Few short-cuts would be available (e.g. 
perhaps dispensing with the observer spacecraft).  If the probability of an actual impact were small and/or the perceived 
consequences were deemed at least marginally “acceptable” at the time the decision had to be made, no-go would probably 
be chosen.  What that probability threshold is would be debatable: does there have to be a >50% chance of a disastrous 
Earth impact or just a 5% chance for decision-makers to invest the minimum of hundreds of millions of dollars to commit to 
a deflection mission?  A concern is that procrastination in deciding to deflect might persist until kinetic deflection could not 
be achieved, and if refinement of the NEO’s trajectory resulted in the impact probability growing toward certainty, one 
would be left with just two alternatives: either the problematic nuclear option or instead “let it hit” addressed only by a 
possibly inadequate set of civil defense measures.  (Of course, civil defense is always a back-up option, however effective it 
might or might not be, if a deflection mission or series of missions were to fail.)  A complex cost-benefit analysis of all 
these factors would have to be conducted to determine the proper course of action in a particular case, but subjective 
judgments might largely determine the conclusions.  One thing is clear, however: it is much more likely that the next threat 
will be from a Chelyabinsk-like impactor rather than a Tunguska, and the kind of >100 m NEO that has long been studied 
for deflection is the least likely case of all.   
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4.  Conclusions 
Deflection or destruction of a threatening NEO must now be regarded as an increasingly unlikely response to an NEO 
threat.  Once ATLAS, or its equivalent, becomes operational, there will be 5,000 times as many cases where people would 
be advised to shelter-in-place away from windows (or move their boats) if an NEO nominally 5 m in diameter or larger 
were predicted to strike for every case of a >100 m NEO requiring deflection, which has a 1-in-10,000 chance of happening 
each year.  Or there would be more than 100 times the frequency of cases of a Chelyabinsk-sized impact as of a 100 m one.  
That does not mean that we should abandon searching for large, as-yet-undiscovered NEOs or that we should cease thinking 
about effective ways of deflecting them for a wide variety of potential scenarios.  We need to better understand the diversity 
of NEO compositions and structures and configurations (e.g. satellites orbiting NEOs) and we need to better understand the 
range of possible responses to deflection impacts and other approaches to moving, or destroying, NEOs. 
But the evolving nature of the impact hazard, as we continually discover NEOs in new ways, and as the predominant 
concern shifts towards more likely, smaller impacts, requires a shift in our technical focus.  For the hypervelocity impact 
community, this should include giving greater attention to the manner in which diverse NEOs might interact with the 
Earth’s atmosphere, ocean, and land and what the human-relevant environmental consequences might be.  NEOs are 
increasingly understood to have diverse shapes (perhaps including an occasional aerodynamic shape, a possible reason for 
the unexpected 2007 Carancas impact by a small, stony object), diverse configurations (including binaries and contact 
binaries), diverse structures (ranging from rubble piles to monoliths), diverse compositions (ranging from underdense 
cometary nuclei to nickel-iron), and a wide range of sizes.  Of course they can penetrate the atmosphere at angles ranging 
from nearly horizontal to vertical and at velocities ranging from Earth’s escape velocity to many tens of km per second.  
What kinds of consequences are possible from the various impact scenarios, especially in terms of those that might damage 
infrastructure or cause human casualties? 
Beyond technical calculations of the consequences of impact, it is important that the practical results of such research be 
effectively communicated to emergency managers and civil defense officials so that appropriate warnings are issued based 
on the best available science. 
Hypervelocity impact physics lies far from the realm of human intuition, yet practical consequences of research in this 
field have application to a kind of natural disaster that is no longer hypothetical, as demonstrated over Chelyabinsk, Russia, 
just a couple years ago. 
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